Abstract. We apply path-integral techniques to study the dynamics of agent-based models with asymmetric information structures. In particular, we devise a batch version of a model proposed originally by Berg et al. [1] , and convert the coupled multi-agent processes into an effective-agent problem from which the dynamical order parameters in ergodic regimes can be derived self-consistently together with the corresponding phase structure. Our dynamical study complements and extends the available static theory. Results are confirmed by numerical simulations.
Introduction
Over the past years the study of agent-based models of financial markets or other phenomena with the tools of statistical mechanics has proved to be exceptionally fruitful. Many such models can, in the language of statistical mechanics, be understood as fully connected mean-field systems comprising disordered interactions and various types of global frustration. They are thus perfectly suited to be addressed with the techniques developed originally for other purposes, such as the study of magnetic systems, spinglasses or neural networks. Indeed, both static and dynamical methods, including replica techniques and path integrals, have been successfully applied for example to the Minority Game (MG) [2] , presumably one of the most studied models in this context, and have led to an advanced theoretical understanding of the behaviour of various versions of the MG [3] [4] [5] . On the other hand these studies have also revealed new types of complexity and phase transitions, which hitherto had been unknown to statistical physicists.
The standard versions of the MG describe an ensemble of interacting agents who at each time step react to publicly available information by taking trading decisions, e.g. to buy or to sell a given asset. While it is crucial in this setting that the information made available is identical for all agents, no interaction between the individual traders other than through this global and uniform signal is present in the MG. Furthermore, it is essentially of little relevance whether this stream of information is generated endogenously by the system or drawn externally at random [6] as long as all agents react to the same signal. This suffices to generate a remarkably complex dynamics with phenomena including phase transitions, non-ergodic regimes, replica symmetry breaking and memory effects .
The aim of the present paper is to extend the dynamical path-integral formalism to the study of models with private, agent-dependent information. These cases play a major role in economic theory, especially in view of the connection between asymmetric information and the failure of market equilibrium [7] . The model we address here was first introduced in [1] and is a close relative of the Shapley-Shubik model of noncooperative trading equilibrium [8] . While the focus of [1] lies mainly on the statics of the model using replica techniques, we will here complement this work by an analysis of the dynamics based on generating functionals for systems with quenched disorder [9] . Although the dynamical analysis presented here parallels that of the MG, the model displays some novel features and new types of phases. Our analysis sets the stage for further studies addressing subtle issues related to fluctuations and dependence on the learning rate, inherently dynamical features which statics is unable to capture. In the present paper we will mostly be concerned with the mathematical analysis of the model, details of the economic background can be found in [1] and references therein.
Model definitions
The definition of the model follows closely that given in [1] . One considers a single-asset market with N agents labelled by Roman indices. It is assumed that the asset pays a monetary return R(ℓ) at the end of each market round ℓ = 0, 1, 2, . . .. This return depends on the value of a discrete variable ω(ℓ), which models the "state of the world" and is similar to the global signal made available to agents in MGs. We will here assume that ω(ℓ) is determined externally, similar to MGs with randomly drawn exogenous information. Specifically, ω(ℓ) is selected randomly and independently at each round with flat probability distribution from the set {1, . . . , Ω}. The statistical mechanics analysis will ultimately be concerned with the thermodynamic limit N → ∞, which is taken in a way such that the relative number of possible states of the world Ω/N remains finite. The ratio α = Ω/N turns out to be the key control parameter of the model. The asset return at time ℓ is then given as R(ℓ) = R ω(ℓ) , where the components of the vector R = (R 1 , . . . , R Ω ) are taken to be quenched random variables, drawn at the start of the game and then kept fixed. It is assumed that they each take the form
where R > 0 is a constant, and where the { R ω } are independent, identically distributed Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance λ 2 > 0. Thus, the Bernoulli process {ω(ℓ)} ℓ≥0 induces the time series of asset returns {R(ℓ) ≡ R ω(ℓ) } ℓ≥0 . R and λ are additional model parameters. The motivation for the choice (1) will become clear in the following.
Contrary to MGs, traders in this model are unable to observe the state ω(ℓ) directly. Rather, each of them has access only to a coarse-grained signal on {1, . . . , Ω} which corresponds to some fixed private information scheme. In particular, the signal observed by a given trader i is determined by the vector
The components of any k i (i = 1, . . . , N) are again assumed to be drawn at random and independently from {−1, 1} with equal probability for all i and ω at the beginning of the game and are kept fixed afterwards. In this way, each trader has a private information source providing him with a binary signal k
at time ℓ. This private signal does depend on the state ω(ℓ), but exactly what this state is at time ℓ is not known to the individual agents. Since the {R ω } and the {k i } are drawn independently, the sequence {k ω(ℓ) i } ℓ≥0 observed by agent i will in general not allow him to tell what return R ω(ℓ) is to be expected at time step ℓ. Crucially, however, the correlation between the vectors k i and R are heterogeneous across the population of traders, so that different agents will have varying abilities to resolve the individual states ω ∈ {1, . . . , Ω}.
At each round ℓ of the game every agent decides to invest a monetary amount z ik ω(ℓ) i (ℓ) ≥ 0 which depends on the signal k ω(ℓ) i ∈ {−1, 1} he receives at stage ℓ. The total amount invested by agents at round ℓ determines the price of the asset:
It remains to specify how the agents determine the amounts {z iσ (ℓ)} they invest. It is assumed that traders are adaptive and that their behaviour is governed by an inductive learning dynamics. Specifically, each agent has a propensity u iσ (ℓ) to invest under each of the two possible signals σ ∈ {−1, 1}; these propensities are initialized at values u iσ (0) at time t = 0 and are updated at the end of every round according to the marginal success of the investment:
Here Γ > 0 is a learning rate ‡, while Q i (ℓ) stands for the payoff received by trader i at the end of round ℓ. The {Q i (ℓ)} can be specified upon noting that at each round every agent puts forward his bid before p(ℓ) is known and makes profit if the return of the asset exceeds its price. The price in turn is determined by the collective action of all traders, Eq. (3). Now since agent i acquires z i,k
(ℓ)/p(ℓ) units of the asset, each ‡ In principle, different agents i might have different learning rates Γ i . We here restrict the discussion to the case Γ i ≡ Γ for all i. Our theory can be generalised to populations of agents with heterogeneous learning rates.
yielding an effective return of R(ℓ) − p(ℓ), the following form for the payoffs is assumed:
For simplicity, we linearise the payoff as in [1] and consider
To compute the marginal payoffs
, note that p(ℓ) is itself a function of z iσ (ℓ), so that in principle one has
In general, traders may not be able to evaluate how much their decision affects the price, i.e. naïve agents who neglect the impact of their own trading action might ignore the second term on the right-hand side, while other so-called sophisticated agents [10] might be able to take into account this market-impact correction. We will not allow for any heterogeneity across the agents in this respect, but will instead study the dynamics
Here η ≥ 0 is a further model parameter which accounts for the (uniform) ability of the agents to estimate the impact of their trading actions on the price. For η = 0 agents act as 'price takers' and neglect the effect of the term
when updating the propensities; on the other hand for η = 1 they fully correct for their impact on the price process. Tuning η ∈ [0, 1] allows to consider agents of increasing sophistication, similar to what is done in MGs with market-impact correction. Finally, the propensities {u iσ (ℓ)} are related to the investments {z iσ (ℓ)} made at time step ℓ via
where θ(x) is the step-function, i.e. θ(x) = 1 for x > 0 and θ(x) = 0 otherwise §. The model may thus be summarised as follows. At each time step ℓ a 'state of the world' ω(ℓ) ∈ {1, . . . , Ω} is drawn at random. Each agent i then receives a signal k ω(ℓ) i ∈ {−1, 1} corresponding to his private information structure. Given the perceived signal he decides to invest an amount z i,k ω(ℓ) i (ℓ) ≥ 0 according to (9) , based on the propensity u i,k ω(ℓ) i (ℓ). From the investments of all agents a total price p(ℓ) is determined via the market clearing condition (3). Each individual agent i then updates the propensity u iσ for the perceived signal σ = k ω(ℓ) i according to (8) , and leaves the propensity for the opposite signal −σ unchanged.
We shall mostly be interested in the stationary state(s) of the model, and in particular in the question of whether agents can co-ordinate efficiently even if their access to the global signal is filtered through their private information schemes. We will refer to 'market efficiency' as the situation in which returns are fully reflected by the prices. In order to quantify the efficiency, or otherwise, of the market we consider the 'squared distance' between prices and returns in the steady state :
where · · · |ω stands for a time-average in the steady state conditioned on the occurrence of state ω. Phases in which prices equal returns in all states ω, and in which accordingly H = 0 are said to be efficient, whereas phases with H = 0 are referred to as inefficient. A second quantity of interest measures how differently the agents behave upon receiving the two different signals, and is defined as follows:
Here . . . stands for a time-average in the stationary state. q measures the extent to which agents use the information available to them. Small values of q indicate that the investment they make is nearly independent of the observed signal, while the perceived signal is strongly correlated with their trading actions for large values of q. Before turning to the details of the further analysis, let us briefly summarise the static picture of the model as found in [1] . For η = 0 the system undergoes a phase transition from an efficient to an inefficient regime at a critical value α c , which depends on the details of the disorder statistics. In the sub-critical phase at α < α c , where H = 0, the asymptotic value of q depends on initial conditions. For the game with sophisticated agents (η = 1), instead, no such transition occurs and the system is inefficient for all α. Moreover the dynamics is ergodic. Loosely writing q turns out to be larger for the game without impact-correction than it is for η = 1. Thus, naïve agents use the information more than sophisticated ones, though the latter have larger gains.
Generating functional analysis

Batch dynamics
The learning rule (8) corresponds to what is known as an 'on-line' model in the context of the MG [4] , with an explicit dependence on ω(ℓ) at each time step ℓ. It is analytically convenient to replace this type of updating scheme by one in which an effective average over all values of ω(ℓ) ∈ {1, . . . , αN} is carried out at every time step, as in MGs [4] . The resulting 'batch' model roughly describes a situation in which propensity updates are performed only once every O(Ω) time steps, and is defined by
It will turn out that R(ℓ) − p(ℓ)|ω = O(N −1/2 ), so that H as defined above is indeed of order one. This is observed in numerical simulations, but will also become manifest in the course of the generating functional analysis presented below. where now the price at round ℓ is effectively a vector of prices, {p ω (ℓ)}, one for each state ω: Np
. This modification has turned out to have little effect on the steady state properties of conventional MGs [11] , but carries the advantage of simplifying the analytical theory considerably. Numerical results confirm that the batch and on-line versions of the present model are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar as far as the order parameters q and H and the breakdown of ergodicity at α c are concerned, see Fig. 1 . Notice that in the present batch model the learning rate Γ effectively fixes a time-scale, it also has a subtle influence on transients. It is convenient to introduce the variables
in terms of which one has z iσ (ℓ) = x i (ℓ) + σy i (ℓ), and
where we have introduced external perturbation fields {h iσ (ℓ)} which will be used later in order to generate response functions. While the dynamics of the MG with S = 2 strategies per player can be written in terms of one degree of freedom per agent (the so-called score difference), no such simplification can be made in the present game and we have to keep both the {x i (ℓ)} and the {y i (ℓ)}. Writing δ τ τ ′ = (1 + τ τ ′ )/2 for τ, τ ∈ {−1, 1}, (14) can be simplified further using the facts that lim Ω→∞ (1/Ω) ω R ω = 0 and lim Ω→∞ (1/Ω) ω δ σ,k ω i = 1/2. Subsequently, one may re-scale time to arrive at
where t is now a re-scaled time. (15) is the process we shall consider.
The effective-agent process
The aim of every dynamical theory of disordered systems is to derive a closed set of equations for the behavior of macroscopic correlation and response functions in the limit N → ∞. We apply the path-integral method first devised for systems with quenched disorder by De Dominicis [9] . This technique is based on the computation of the moment generating functional
where ψ = (ψ − , ψ + ) are generating source fields and where · · · denotes an average over the process (14) with respect to the distribution p(u(0)) of initial conditions u(0) = {u iσ (0)} from which the dynamics is started. The shorthand Du stands for t,σ,i du iσ (t)/ √ 2π . Correlation and response functions can be obtained by taking derivatives of the disorder-averaged generating functional Z[ψ] with respect to the source fields {ψ iσ (t)} and/or the perturbing fields {h iσ (t)} and by subsequently considering the limit of vanishing fields. Our ultimate goal is to obtain self-consistent equations for these physically relevant observables in the limit N → ∞.
The calculation can be performed along the following lines. First, one expresses the δ-distributions in (16) in their exponential representation (we denote the conjugate parameters of the {u iσ (t)} by { u iσ (t)}). Next, the average over the quenched disorder {R} and {k i } is evaluated. This is done conveniently by introducing the parameters
where y i (t) is given by (13) while w i (t) stands for
As usual, disorder-averaging generates macroscopic objects (dynamical order parameters). In the present problem, they are given by
These definitions can again be inserted into Z[ψ] via δ-distributions. Finally, factorising the resulting expression over agents and states wherever possible one arrives at the familiar form
The
with the shorthands Da = t da(t)/ √ 2π (and similarly for D a, Db, D b) and Du = t,σ du σ (t)/ √ 2π (and similarly for D u), and
Note that we have assumed that the distribution of initial conditions factorizes over agents and the index σ and that the distribution of the starting points is identical for all agents, so that p(u(0)) = iσ p σ (u iσ (0)). The integrals in (20) can then be performed by the method of steepest descents in the limit N → ∞. The dominant contributions here come from terms of order N in the exponent, and are contained in Ψ, Φ and Υ as given above. All terms of sub-leading order carry zero weight in the thermodynamic limit. The saddle-point conditions can then be worked out by taking derivatives of the exponent in (20) with respect to the integration variables. Differentiation with respect to m and ϕ leads to the relations
where · · · ⋆ denotes an average with respect to the probability measure defined by the single-agent process described by Υ:
All order parameters appearing in this measure take their saddle-point values and the auxiliary fields ψ have been set to zero; also, we assumed h iσ (t) = h σ (t) for all i. Notice that (25) implies that the average investment equals R. We will henceforth set m = 0 and use (25) as an additional condition to be satisfied by the solutions. As for ϕ, its physical meaning and value will become clear when the steady state will be worked out explicitly in the next section. The saddle-point conditions for m and ϕ read
where
These two equations admit the self-consistent solution m = ϕ = 0, the integrals vanishing due to symmetry. It remains to compute the saddle-point values of the order parameters {Q, L, K} and of their conjugates { Q, K, L}. Extremisation of the exponent in (20) with respect to { Q, K, L} gives
By taking derivatives of the generating functional with respect to the fields {ψ, h} one may check that Q and K can be identified with correlation and response functions of the original multi-agent system
L vanishes identically by virtue of the built-in normalization Z[0] = 1 (see [11] ). Finally, the saddle-point equations corresponding to the integrations over {Q, L, K} read
Φ can be evaluated explicitly by successively integrating (22) over the {a(t)}, { a(t)} and {b(t)}. Taking the required derivatives one finds that
Motivated by (35), we shall henceforth set G = −iK. Inserting the saddle-point conditions into (28) leads to the effective-agent process
where σ ∈ {−1, 1} and z σ (t) = u σ (t)θ[u σ (t)], while ξ(t) is a zero-average Gaussian noise with temporal correlations given by the covariance matrix
Note that the representative agent is here described by a pair of processes, u σ (t), σ ∈ {−1, 1} at variance with the versions of the MG studied so far, where one has only process (for the so-called score difference). The one-time function ϕ and the twotime functions Q and G are the dynamical order parameters of the problem, to be determined self-consistently according to (31) and (33), where the average · · · ⋆ is over the effective process (40), i.e. over realisations of {ξ(t)}, subject to the constraint (25). As usual, the resulting self-consistent effective agent problem is fully equivalent to the original coupled N-particle dynamics in the thermodynamic limit N → ∞ in the sense that Q and G are the correlation and response functions of the original batch problem. The non-trivial correlation structure of the single-particle noise and the non-Markovian term coupling to times t ′ ≤ t in the effective process (40) are direct consequences of the presence of quenched disorder in the original multi-agent system, and impede a full analytical solution for the dynamical order parameters at all times. For models of the present type the alternative numerical iteration scheme provided by [12] is restricted to O(10 2 ) time steps due to computational limitations. In our case equilibration times turn out to be much larger. Note that the constraint x(t) ⋆ = R (for all times t) is not an external one as for example in spherical models [13] , but rather it is self-generated by the system in the thermodynamic limit. For this reason ϕ has no direct analogue in the original N-particle problem, but appears only in the effective process.
Average price/return fluctuations
The fluctuations of the difference between price and return are given by
(note that the above quantity with the explicit pre-factor N turns out to be of order one). This is equivalent to
where we made use of (17). Proceeding as before and integrating by parts over b ω (t) one sees that
Anticipating that in the limit N → ∞ the behavior of d(t, t ′ ) will be dominated by the same saddle-point describing Z[ψ] and at which m = ϕ = 0 we have
Integrating over a, a and b we find
so that indeed d(t, t ′ ) as defined above is of order one. E is the matrix with all entries equal to one.
Following similar steps one can calculate the average price-return difference, namely
One finds
This integral vanishes due to symmetry, hence A(t) is a zero-average process with temporal correlations d(t, t ′ ) of order one.
Ergodic steady states
General considerations
Due to the presence of the coloured noise ξ(t) and of the retarded self-interaction in the effective process (40) it is in general not feasible to solve the self-consistent system {(25),(31),(33)} analytically for all times t, t ′ . We shall therefore restrict ourselves to studying the ergodic steady states of the effective-agent problem. These are timetranslation invariant solutions,
and with finite integrated response,
With these Ansätze one performs a time-average of the effective process (40), leading to
Here, we have introduced u σ = lim t→∞ u σ (t)/t (roughly representing the 'velocity' with which the propensities grow in time), as well as the static variables
h σ (t) has been set to zero. Note that ξ is (static) Gaussian noise of zero mean and variance
and that the z σ , σ ∈ {−1, 1} as well as y are stochastic variables, coupled to the value of ξ via Eq. (52). The parameter
represents the persistent part of the correlation function which, together with χ and ϕ, is to be determined self-consistently from
Note that, up to a pre-factor, the noise acts effectively as an external field, so that χ can be expressed in terms of a derivative with respect to ξ. Recalling (13) one realises that q is indeed the observable defined in (11) .
In the stationary state the matrix d(t, t ′ ) will also be time-translation invariant, and similar to the MG one finds
The magnitude of the fluctuations of the price around its temporal mean is given by
For this quantity one has the exact relation
A further evaluation of δp 2 hence requires in principle the full knowledge of the transient contributions to the correlation and response functions. While the analogous quantity in the MG can be well approximated in terms of persistent order parameters, such an estimate appears much more subtle here due to an explicit dependence of the fluctuations on the learning rate. Defining Q(t, t ′ ) = Q(t, t ′ ) − q one has
where Q is a measure of the fluctuations of the variables y i (t) around their temporal averages, and depends on the learning rate. For Γ → 0 no fluctuations are present, so that δp 2 → 0, as pointed out in [1] . In general, the right-hand-side is an increasing function of Γ, which is difficult to express in terms of persistent order parameters within the present setup. We choose here to focus on the asymptotics of the model.
In order to proceed with the analysis of (52) one inspects the behaviour of the {u iσ (t)} in numerical simulations, and formulates suitable Ansätze for u σ , corresponding to different types of solutions observed in simulations. For purposes of clarity, we will treat the cases η = 0 and η > 0 separately in the following. 
η = 0
Simulations of the model without impact-correction reveal the existence of three distinct phases, two ergodic ones and a third with anomalous response:
• For large α greater than a critical value α ⋆ both propensities u iσ are positive on average and remain finite in the steady state for all agents. Each agent asymptotically invests finite amounts under both signals. The corresponding effective agent has u σ = 0 for both σ ∈ {−1, 1}. We shall refer to this phase as the '2-phase', indicating that all agents invest under both signals.
• For intermediate α agents are divided into two groups. Some agents do not invest under either signal, both of their propensities decrease linearly with time, so that u σ < 0 for both σ ∈ {−1, 1}. Each of the remaining agents invest under one signal (say σ i for player i) but not under the opposite signal −σ i . For such agents, the propensity u iσ i (t) is positive and remains finite asymptotically, while the other one decreases linearly in time. This corresponds to trajectories of the effective process with u σ = 0 for one value σ ∈ {−1, 1} and u −σ < 0. We will refer to this phase as the '1 + 0-phase', indicating that some players do not invest under either signal, while others invest under precisely one signal.
• For low α less than a critical value α c one finds that the macroscopic order parameters of the steady state depend on initial conditions, see Fig. 1 . Hence the dynamics is non-ergodic, and we expect the integrated response χ to be infinite in this regime. We will label this phase by NE (non-ergodic) in the following.
It will turn out that the relevant control parameters for the phase behaviour of the model are given by α and the ratio λ/R of the mean return over its standard deviation, the learning rate Γ has no influence on the persistent order parameters in the stationary states, but only on the transients of the dynamics. The resulting phase diagram in the (α, λ/R)-plane is depicted in Fig. 2 We will now study the two ergodic phases separately, starting with the phase at intermediate values of α, and will compute the persistent order parameters in the two ergodic phases, as well as the boundaries α ⋆ and α c separating the three regimes.
4.2.1. The 1 + 0 phase at intermediate α Agents who do not invest under either signal correspond to solutions of the effective agent process with
While the specific values of the u σ , σ ∈ {−1, 1} will play no role for the further analysis, we would like to stress that different realisations of the effective process (that is different realisations of the noise ξ) can in general lead to different values for the u σ , σ ∈ {−1, 1} and for the z σ . For agents who invest under one signal, but not under the other, we will inspect solutions of the effective process of the following two types:
The former corresponds to agents who invest under signal σ = 1, the latter to agents who play upon receiving σ = −1. In both cases, u takes a positive value, which again in principle may vary for different realisations of the effective process. In either case summing the two relations (52) (with η = 0) leads to
In particular u takes the same value for all (effective) agents who invest under exactly one signal. Self-consistency demands ϕ > 0 as we have assumed above that u is positive. Taking the difference of the two equations of (52) we find
where the plus signs describes the case y > 0 while the minus sign holds when y < 0. Setting ξ ⋆ = ϕ/ √ α one sees that the former case is realized when ξ > ξ ⋆ , the latter when ξ < −ξ ⋆ . For |ξ| < ξ ⋆ no solution with |y| > 0 is possible and the corresponding effective agent never invests, as discussed above. We conclude that the physical interpretation of ϕ is closely related to the relative weight of the two types of agents. Indeed, the probability that an agent is inactive, that is the fraction of agents who do not invest under either signal, is given by
where γ = ξ 2 , see (54). The persistent order parameters ϕ, q and χ are obtained from the self-consistency relations
which may be written as
This coupled system of non-linear equations is easily solved numerically (for example using Newton-Raphson methods), and the order parameters q, χ and ϕ may be obtained as functions of α for any fixed values of the model parameters R, λ and Γ. The dependence of these persistent order parameters on the learning rate Γ can be understood by an inspection of (69). One finds that the solution is Γ-independent when expressed in terms of the re-scaled variables {q, Γχ, ϕ/Γ}. H can in turn be obtained from (57). This solution is valid self-consistently as long as χ turns out to be finite, and as long as ϕ comes out positive. The point at which the latter condition breaks down is easily determined upon setting ϕ = 0 in the above coupled set of equations. After some algebra one finds that this occurs at
which coincides with the static result [1] . The onset of anomalous response, i.e. the point α c at which χ diverges at fixed values of λ, Γ and R is found to be determined by the condition ¶
α c is obtained as α c = erfc(ζ c ) where ζ c is the root of
Note that due to Eq. (57) H vanishes at the point of diverging χ. Hence the dynamical phase transition between the ergodic and non-ergodic regimes coincides with the transition between efficient (H = 0) and non-efficient (H > 0) phases observed in [1] . One finds numerically that α c < α ⋆ for all fixed values of the parameters λ, Γ, R, so that we conclude that the 1 + 0-phase is physically realised for intermediate values
4.2.2. The 2-phase at α > α ⋆ . Here we set u σ = 0 for both σ ∈ {−1, 1} in (52). Summing the resulting expressions for σ = 1 and σ = −1 one immediately finds ϕ = 0 for η = 0. Taking the difference, instead, yields
This in turn implies that
from which we can directly read off the value of q in the 2-phase:
in agreement with the corresponding static result given in [1] . For the susceptibility one obtains
Eqs. (75) and (76) along with our result ϕ = 0 completely describe the persistent order parameters in the ergodic steady states at α > α ⋆ . Note that α ⋆ > 1 by virtue of (70), so that no singularities occur in the 2-phase. Using Eq. (57) H is given by
for α > α ⋆ .
Comparison with simulations
We have tested our theoretical predictions for the game without impact-correction against numerical simulations. Results for H and q are presented in Fig. 3 , while Fig. 4 shows the behaviour of φ 0 . All simulations are performed on the on-line update rules (given by Eq. (8)) with αN 2 = 10 4 . Measurements are taken over 50000 time-steps preceded by 150000 equilibration steps. All data presented are averages over 100 samples of the disorder. The learning rate is kept fixed at Γ = 1 (we have verified the independence of q and H of the learning rate in separate simulations). The figures demonstrate very good agreement of the theoretical predictions with the numerical data, modulo finite-size effects close to the transition points. We observe that q is a decreasing function of α in the two ergodic phases, with a cusp at the transition point between the 1+0-and the 2-phase at α = α ⋆ . The breakdown of ergodicity below α c can be illustrated by starting the dynamics from differently biased initial propensities. While the macroscopic order parameter q is insensitive to initial conditions above α c , the starting point becomes relevant in the non-ergodic phase, as shown in Fig. 1 . 
η > 0
For η > 0 the situation is slightly more complicated. One observes at all α that agents are divided in two classes: those who trade under both signals and those who trade at most under one signal. Let us discuss this scenario in detail. The former have
Notice that for these agents x = (z + + z − )/2 > |y| = |(z + − z − )/2|. For the latter one has instead (62) and (63) as before. For them, x = y when y > 0 and x = −y when y < 0. Let us start with the traders who always invest. Summing equations (52) with non-zero η and u σ = 0 one gets
whereas taking the difference gives
The requirement |y| < x now translates into the condition
on the effective noise. Note that ϕ < 0 by virtue of (79). Turning to agents who trade under one signal only, summing equations (52) with non-zero η one finds that (64) and (65) generalize to
where the minus (resp. plus) sign holds for agents with y > 0 (resp. y < 0). Let us focus on agents with y > 0. Combining (82) and (83) one gets
On the other hand, since u > 0 we must have
which via (84) becomes
Similarly one finds that the solution with y < 0 corresponds to Hence,
, the fraction of players who invest under both signals can be written as
where . . . is again an average over ξ (with variance given by (54)). The saddle-point conditions (56) take the form:
where as before ξ ⋆ = ϕ/ √ α. We do not report the lengthy expressions one obtains after the averages over ξ are carried out, but would like to stress that one readily checks that these equations do not allow for a diverging susceptibility at any finite α. Therefore the model with impact-correction does not exhibit anomalous response, in contrast with the game at η = 0. From (89) the order parameters ϕ, q and χ can be obtained numerically as functions of α for any fixed values of η > 0, λ and Γ, and near perfect agreement is found with numerical simulations, see 
Concluding remarks
We have presented an analysis of the dynamics of a system of adaptive agents with private asymmetric information, complementing and extending the study of the statics of the model previously presented in [1] . To this end we have devised a batch version of the original on-line update rules and observe no significant effects on the persistent order parameters in the stationary states. This demonstrates that the replacement of the online dynamics by an information-averaged batch process as successfully performed in the context of the MG can be extended to other models of interacting agents. Path integral methods can then be used to turn the coupled batch dynamics of the N interacting agents into an effective single-agent problem in the limit N → ∞. From this effective process the persistent order parameters in the different ergodic stationary states as well as the phase diagram can be computed exactly and in agreement with the static results obtained via replica techniques. For the model without impact-correction (η = 0) we find three different phases, two ergodic ones and a phase with broken ergodicity and dependence of the stationary macroscopic order parameters on initial conditions. The location of the onset of ergodicity breaking, α c , coincides with the location of the transition between efficient and non-efficient phases identified in [1] . For sophisticated agents (η > 0) only one phase is present, and no ergodicity breaking occurs. The generating functional approach also allows to address the issue of (average) fluctuations of prices around the (quenched) returns, and an exact relation to the dynamical order parameters can be drawn. The computation of H does not require the knowledge of the transient contributions of the correlation and response functions, but only of their persistent parts (which we can compute exactly). On the other hand full solutions of the self-consistent effective problem for the functions C(τ ) and G(τ ) are needed to calculate the fluctuations of p(t) around R(t). While the corresponding fluctuations in the MG (the so-called volatility) can be well estimated in terms of persistent order parameters, similar approximations appear to be much more delicate in the present model. In addition we find that the volatilities of the batch and on-line models are different, which is not is not surprising as they depend on transients in C and G. Moreover a dependence of the magnitude of fluctuations on the learning rate has been reported in [1] . An analytical study of this dependence is beyond the scope of the present paper; it appears that these issues are more effectively tackled in suitably simplified versions of the model of [1] , work on which is in progress.
In conclusion the dynamical mean field theory extensively used in the context of the MG with common public information can be extended to models of interacting agents with asymmetric non-uniform information. The present model can up to now presumably at best be seen as a most simplistic model of a financial market. Possible extensions include models with heterogeneous learning rates Γ i , such models are of interest both from the mathematical point of view as they would lead to an ensemble of effective processes similar to [15, 16] , but would also allow to study the interaction and relative success of agents with different abilities of adaptation. In the same realm the individual wealth of the agents could be taken into account, each varying in time according to the performance of the agents. It might also be worthwhile studying the influence of decision noise on the phase diagram. Another presumably most interesting extension of the model would be one in which the information available to the agents is not only asymmetric, but also noisy. Finally, in the present model the 'states of the world' ω are drawn at random at each time step. With techniques now available to study Minority Games with real histories [4] , an attempt might be made to replace this external random signal by endogenously generated pieces of information relating to the previous history of the market. The state ω(t) at a given time step t might for example encode the prices p(t − 1), p(t − 2), . . . , p(t − M) of the previous M steps or relate to the history of differences between prices and returns. Work along some of these lines is currently in progress.
